AB-KV-Ch23
Tipitaka >> Abhidhamma Pitaka >> Kathavatthu >> ‘’’Kathavatthu Ch23’’’ Pali Versions : Pali English Version and Pali Devanagri Version =Kathavatthu Chapter23= 622. United Resolve 365 BOOK XXIII 1. Of United Resolve. Controverted Point . — That sexual relations may be entered upon with a united resolve. 1 From the Commentary. — Such a vow may be undertaken, some think — for instance, the Andhakas and the Yetulyakas 2 — by a human pair who feel mutual sympathy or compassion 8 passion merely, and who are worshipping, it may be, at some Buddha-shrine, and aspire to be united throughout their future lives. 1 Th. — Do you imply that a united resolve may be undertaken which does not befit a recluse, does not become a bhikkhu, or that it may be undertaken by one who has cut off the root rebirth, or when it is a resolve that would lead to a Parajika offence? 4 Or when it is a resolve by which life may be slain, theft committed, lies, slander, harsh words, idle talk uttered, burglary committed, dacoity, robbery, highway robbery, adultery, sack and loot of village or town be committed ?. . . 6 must be more discriminating in your use of the term * with a united resolve ’ ! 1 Ekadhippayo. There is nothing objectionable in the relation so entered upon, except, of course, for the recluse or a member of the Order. 2 See XVII. 6. 3 Karuhha, ‘pity,’ not the term anukampana, which does much duty in Buddhism to express affection in social and conjugal relations. See Ency. Beligions, ‘ Love, Buddhist.’ On the belief in such repeated unions, see Maha, Kassapa’s legend, Pss. of the Brethren, p. B59 1, and Bhadda’s (his wife’s) verses, Pss. of the Sisters, p. 49. 4 Meriting expulsion from the Order. 5 Dialogues , i. 69. 366 The Bailhimt's Choice XXIII. 3. 2. Of Bogus Arahants. Controverted Point . — That infra-human beings, taking the shape of Arahants, 1 follow sexual desires. From the Commentary . — This belief arose in consequence of the dress and deportment of evil-minded bhikkhus, and is held by some — for instance, certain of the Uttar apathakas. 1 Th . — Would you also say that such beings, resem- bling Arahants, commit any or all such crimes as are stated above (XXIII. 1) ? You deny ; but why limit them to one only of those crimes ? 3. Of Self governed Destiny. Controverted Point. — That a Bodhisat (or future Buddha) (a) goes to an evil doom, ( h ) enters a womb, © performs hard tasks, (d) works penance under alien teachers of his own accord and free will. From the Commentary. — Some— for instance, the Andhakas— judge that the Bodhisatta, in the case of the Six-toothed Elephant Jataka 2 and others, was freely so reborn as an animal or in purgatory, that he freely performed difficult tasks, and worked penance under alien teachers. 1 (a) Th . — Do you mean that he so went and endured purgatory, the Sanjlva, Kalasutta, Tapana, Patappia, San- ghataka, Boruva, and Aviehi hells ? If you deny, how can you maintain your proposition ? Can you quote me a Sutta to support this ? 2 (h ). — You maintain that he entered the womb of his own free will. 3 Do you also imply that he chose tp be reborn in purgatory, or as an animal ? That he possessed 1 It should be remembered that in a wider, popular sense, any religieux were — at least, in the commentarial narratives — called Arahants — i.e., ‘worthy ones,’ ‘holy men.’ Cf. Pss. of the Sisters, p. 130 ; Dhammapada Commentary , i. 400. 2 No. 514. 8 The PTS edition omits Am ant a here. Of Bogus Consciousness 367 625. magic potency ? You deny. 1 I ask it again. You assent. 2 Then did he practise the Four Steps to that potency — will, effort, thought, investigation ? Neither can you quote me here a Sutta in justification. 3 (- 129) and in his 4 Expositions ’ (■ Buddhist Review, October, 1915), expanding the section in the Iv.V. Corny., (p. 68, n. 2), of this volume should be considered. In his own Corny, on the Compendium of Philosophy — Paramattha-dlpanZ — he examines more closely the terms we are discussing. ‘Attha,’ he says, 4 may mean : (a) things per se (s a b h a v a - s i d d h a) ; or (b) things merely conceived (p a r ik a p p a - sid dh a). The former (a) include mind, etc., verifiable existents, severally, by their own intrinsic characteristics, and, simply, without reference to any other thing. The latter (h) are not such verifiable existents. They exist by the mind . . . 4 being,’ ‘person,’ etc., are 4 things ’ created by mental synthesis. 3 Of these two classes, only things per se are termed paramattha, real. Attha may therefore be defined as that thing which is intelligible to mind and represent- able by signs, terms or concepts. Paramattha is that reality which, by its truly verifiable existence, transcends 1 See III., p. 81, of Saya Pye’s Tikagyaw and Mauisdramanjusu. 3 Op. et loc. cit. . . . aggalakkhanay viya lokapakati viya. 3 Or ‘logical construction,' as Mr. Bertrand Bussell would say (Lowell Lectures, 1914, p. 59). 374 Thiti concepts. . . . Ultimate facts never fail those who seek for genuine insight. Hence they are real. Concepts, on the other hand, not verifiably existing, fail them ’ (pp. 14-16). 2. Thiti: the Static. (I. 1., p. 55.) In the passage here quoted from the Suttas: — 'of con- ditioned things the genesis is apparent, the passing away is apparent, the duration (as a third distinct state amidst change) is apparent’ — the three stages of ‘becoming’ in all phenomena, always logically distinguishable, if not always patent to sense, are enunciated. That the midway stage is a constant like the others : that between genesis and decay there was also a static stage (perhaps only a zero point of change), designated as thiti (from titthati stha, to stand), was disputed by some — e.g., Ananda, the author of the Ttka on the three Abidhamma Commentaries by Buddhaghosa. But the Compendium itself states the traditional and orthodox tenet in the case of units of mental phenomena : ‘ one thought-moment con- sists of three time-phases, to wit, nascent, static, and arresting phases ’ {Comp., pp. 25, 26, 125). In the Sutta the word rendered by * duration ’ is not thiti, but thitanap, gen. plur. of thitaij, or static thing. Commentarial philosophy tended to use the abstract form. It also distinguished (or commented upon as already distinguished) two kinds of duration (or enduring things): kh anika-thiti, ‘momentary duration,’ and pabandha-thiti, or combined duration. The latter constitutes the more popularly conceived notion of j a r a : decay, old age, degeneration in any phenomenon. The Puggalavadin was thinking of this notion when he answered the first question. Now if, in the Sutta, duration was to be understood as a static stage between genesis and decay, it would almost certainly have been named in such an order. But it was named last. And it may well be that the more cultured intel- ' Everything Exists ’ 375 lect of the propounder of the Sutta did not accept the popular notion of any real stationariness (thiti) in a cosmos of incessant change, but only took it into account as a com- monly accepted view, expressing it, not as one positive phase in three positive phases of becomings but negatively, as this £ otherness 5 of duration (he., a state of duration other than genesis and passing away) appears to ordinary intelligence. 3. Sabbam atthi : ‘ Everything Exists.’ (I. 6, p. 84 f.) At first sight it would appear that the emphasis is on the first word: ‘everything,’ ‘all.’ This would be the case if the thesis were here opposed toekaceam atthi: ‘ some things exist, some do not,’ which is discussed in the next discourse but one. But the context shows clearly that, in both these theses, the emphasis is really on the word ‘atthi’: ‘ is,’ in the sense of ‘ exists.’ Now the Burmese translator supplies after sab bap, a term which, in Pali, is dhamma-jataq. This, dis- connected, is d h a m m a s s a j a t a ij : the arising or happening of dhamma; anything, that is, which exists as a fact, as opposed to a chimeera, or in the Pali idiom, a hare’s horn. (We use the term ‘ thing ’ not in the sense of substance, or having a substrate, but as anything which is exhausted, as to its being, by some or all of the known twenty- eight qualities of body or matter, and by the facts of mind. Should s a b b a q be understood collectively — ‘ all,’ or distributively — ‘ everything ’ ? Taken by itself, one of the questions in § 1, p. 85 : “ Does ‘ all ’ exist in all things ?” would incline us at first sight to the former alternative, at least in the case of the locative term. Yet even here we do not read the question as : Is there in the whole a whole ? but as : Does the whole exist in everything, or every part ? taking the nominative, sabbaij, collectively, the locative, s a b b e s u, distributively. And the context in general leads us to the latter alternative. The Sabbatthivadin believes in the continued existence of any particular thing past, 376 Scibbam atthi present, and future. The Commentator accounted for this belief by that school’s interpretation of this postulate : No past, present, or future dhamma’s (facts-as-cognized) abandon the kh andha-nature (sabbe pi atltadi- bheda dhamma khandha-sabhavaij na vijahanti). Once a dhamma, always a dhamma. The live aggre- gates (kh and ha’s), in other words matter-mind, however they may vary at different times, bear the same general characteristics all the time. Perhaps the following quotation from John Locke’s critics, taken from Green and Grose’s Hume, vol. i., p. 87, may help to show the Commentator’s meaning with reference to the rupakkhandha, or material aggregate : ‘ But of this (that is, of another thing which has taken the place of a previous thing, making an impact on the sensitive tablet at one moment, but perishing with it the next moment), the real essence is just the same as the previous thing, namely, that it may be touched, or is solid, or a body, or a parcel of matter; nor can this essence be really lost. . . . It follows that real change is impossible. A parcel of matter at one time is a parcel of matter at all times.’ Thus, the Sabbatthivadin might say, because a parcel of matter to which we assign the name 'gold'’ was yellow, fusible, etc., in the past, is so now, and will be so in future, therefore gold £ exists.’ Again, because fire burned yester- day, burns to-day, and will burn to-morrow, therefore fire exists. In some such way this school had come to believe in the immutable existence, the real essence of all or everyt hin g, taken in the distributive sense of everything without excep- tion ; but not always excluding the collective sense. Pupa — e.g., in § 3 : 'Do past material qualities exist?’ — refers to the rupakkhandha, i.e., in a collective sense. That, however, does not preclude any one of the twenty-eight qualities of body ( Compendium , pp. 157-160) from being taken distributively, or prevent any material object com- posed of eight or more of these qualities from being discussed separately. • ' Everything Exists ’ 377 In the heckling dialectic of the paragraph numbered 23 (p. 89, f.), we have found it necessary to supply certain terms chosen according to the context, and from the Com- mentary. The Pali reader should consult the Burmese edition of the latter, since there are errors of printing and punctuation in that compiled byMinayeff (PTS edition p.45). It may prove helpful if we give in English the Burmese translation of the Commentary from p. 45, 1. 18, PTS edition : ‘ A t h a nap Sakavadl:yadi te.’ . . . Theravadin : ‘Let that thing of yours, which, on becom- ing present after having been future, be taken into account as “having been, is.” And let it equally be spoken of as “ again having been, is.” Then a chimeera which, not having been future can not become present, should be spoken of as “not having been, is not.” But does your chimeera repeat the negative process of not having been, is not? If so, it should be spoken of as “again not having been, is not.” ’ The Opponent thinks: ‘An imaginary thing cannot, having been future, become present, because of its very non- existence. Let it then be spoken of as “ not having been, is not” (“na hutva na hoti nama tava hotu.”) But how can such a thing repeat the negative process (literally ‘ state ’ : b h a v o) ? If not, it cannot be spoken of as “ again not having been, is not.” The Sabbatthivadin is here and throughout represented as dealing with mere abstract ideas of time — i.e., with abstract names for divisions of time — and not with things or facts. The object of the Theravadin, in introducing imaginary things, is to refute arguments so based. His opponent is not prepared to push his abstractions further by allowing a repetition of a process which actually never once takes place. 4. Patisambhida ; Analysis. (See p. 179, V. 5.) In this, the earliest Buddhist doctrine of logical analysis, the four branches (or * Four Patisambhida’s), frequently referred to are (1) Attha-patisambhida: analysis 878 Patisamhhidd of meanings * in extension.’ (2) Dhamma-patisam- b h i cl a : analysis of reasons, conditions, or causal relations. (3) Nirutti- patisambhida: analysis of ‘in intension ’ as given in definitions. (4)Patibhana-pati- sambhida: analysis of intellect to which things knowable by the foregoing processes are presented. 1. ‘Attha’ does not refer to verbal meanings. Lecli Sadaw and U. Pandi agree with us that it means the £ thing ’ signified by the term. Hence it is equivalent to the European notion of denotation, or meaning in extension. 2. The latter authority holds that dhamma refers to terms. has, by the way, a scheme of correspondence between the branches of the literary concept havi, and the above-named branches : — Attha-kavi . . . Suta-kavi Cinta-kavi Patibhana-kavi Attha-patisambhida. Dhamma- ,, Nirutti- ,, Patibhana ,, suggested by the mutually coinciding features. But in the A bhidh anappad ipi I;.ci-su cl, art. dhamma, this term, in the present connection, is taken to mean hctu, or paccaya (condition, or causal relation) : hetumhi nanai) dhamma - patisambhidiiti adlsu hetumhi p a c e ay e . 8. Nirutti ( n i [ r ] : ‘ de u 1 1 i : ‘ expression ’) means, popularly, * grammar technically it is ‘ word-definition ’ (viggaha, vacanattha). E.g., Bujjhatiti Buddho — ‘Buddha is one who knows ’ — is a definition of the word ‘Buddha.’ Such a definition is nirutti, the meaning being now expressed or uttered. Hence nirutti may stand for the European connotation, or meaning in intension. 4. Patibhana ( p a t i : ‘ re ’ ; b h a : ‘to become ap- parent ’) is defined in the A bhidh an appadjpiha-s del : patimukha bhavanti, upatthahanti neyya etenati patibhanap: ‘Patibhana’ means that by which things knowable (1, 2, 8) become represented, are present. The representative or ideating processes are Analysis 379 not themselves patisambhida, but are themselves (as knowables) analyzed in ‘ analytic insight ’ (patisam- bhida - h a n a ij ) ^ Thus the scope of this classic doctrine is entirely logical. And while it is regarded as superior to popular knowledge, it is distinct from intuition. Men of the world may develop it, but not intuition. Ariyans, who attain to intuition, might not have developed it to any great extent. Patisambhida in the Yihhanyu. (PTS edition, chap, xv., p. 293 f.) The definition quoted above, § 2, cites this work : hetumhi nanap d h a mm a p a ti sambhida, p. 293. In the list of exegetical definitions of the four branches, entitled ‘ Suttanta-bhajaniyap,’ we find (1) Attha-pati- sambhida defined as analysis of phenomena, dhamma, or things that £ have happened, become, . . . that are mani- fest’; (2) dhamma-patisambhida, defined as knowledge of conditions ( hetu ), of cause and effect (lietuphala), ‘ of phenomena by which phenomena have happened, become,’ etc. Thus (1) may be knowledge of decay and death ; (2) is then knowledge of the causes ( samudaya ) of decay and death. Similarly for the third and fourth Truths (Cessation and the Path). But (2) may also refer to the Doctrine, or Dhamma : — ‘ knowledge of the Suttas, the Verses,’ and the rest. 1 Patibhana is here defined as a technical term of Buddhist philosophy. Its popular meaning of fluency in literary expression is well illustrated in the Vangisa Sayyutta (i. 187 of the Nikciya). Vangisa, the irrepressibly fluent ex-occultist, is smitten with remorse for having, because of his rhetorical gifts (patibhana), despised friendly brethren, and breaks forth once more to express his re- pentance, admonishing himself — as G-otama, i.e., as the Buddha’s disciple {Corny.) — to put away conceit. "When the afflatus was upon him in the Buddha’s presence, he would ask leave to improvise with the words : 1 It is manifest revealed to me, Exalted One !’ The response is : ‘ Let it he manifest to thee, Vangisa !’ And he would forthwith improvise verses. Cf. Pss. of the Brethren, p. 395, especially pp. 399, 404. 380 Patisambhida Of the third and fourth branches, nirutti-patis ° is always, in this chapter, defined as abhilapa, or verbal expression, or statement. And p a t i b h a n a-p a t i s° is always defined as * knowledge in the knowledges,’ as if it referred to psychological analysis. In the following section or Abhidhammabhajaniyaij, we find an inverted order in branches 1, 2. The dhamma’s considered are all states of consciousness. If they are moral or immoral — i.e., if they have karmic efficacy (as causes) — knowledge of them is called d h a m m a-analysis. Knowledge of their remit, and of all an moral or inoperative states, which as such are results, is called a 1 1 h a-analysis. As to 3, 4 : knowledge of the connotation and expression of dhamma’s as p a nnatti’s (term-concepts) isnirutti- analysis. And * the knowledge by which one knows those knowledges ’ (1-3) is p a t i b h a n a-analysis. We are greatly indebted to the kindness of Ledi Sadaw Mahathera for a further analysis of Patisambhidii: ‘ In this word, p a t i means v i s up v i s u i) (separately, one after another) ; s a m means * well,’ ‘ thoroughly ’ b h i d a means to ‘ break up. 1 Thus we get : Patisam- bhida is that by which Ariyan folk well separate, analyze things into parts. This, as stated above, is fourfold : 1. At th a- patisambhida includes — (a) Bhasit’attha, meaning in extension, things signified by words; (b) Pac- cayuppann’attha, things to which certain other things stand in causal relation ; © Yi p a k ’ a 1 1 h a, resultant mental groups and matter born of karma; (cl) Kiriy’- attha; inoperative mental properties — e.g., ‘advertings’ of the mind, etc. ; (e) N i b b a n a, the unconditioned. 2. Dhamma-patisambhidii includes — (a) Bhasita- d h a m m a, or words spoken by the Buddha ; (b) P a c e a y a - dhamma, things relating themselves to other objects by way of a cause ; © Kusala-dhamma; (d) Akusala- dhamma, thoughts moral and immoral ; '(«) Ariya- magga-dhamma, the Ariyan Path. Analysis and Penetration 381 8. N i r u 1 1 i-p a t i s a m b h i d a is grammatical analysis of sentences. 4. Patibhana-patisambhida is analytic insight into the three preceding (1-8). Further details may be found in the Commentaries on the Patisam bhidamagga 1 and the Vibhanga. 5. Patisambhida, Abhisamaya : Analysis and Penetration. (II., 9, 10.) The latter term means literally £ beyond-well-making-go,’ and, in this physical sense, is used once or twice in the Vedas and the Upanisads. Mental activity, however, borrowed the term now and then in the older Upanisads, so that the double usage obtained contemporaneously, just as we speak of £ getting at,’ or £ grasping ’ either a book, or a meaning in it. In Buddhist literature the secondary psychological, and metaphysical meaning would seem alone to have survived. Buddhaghosa, commenting on the I)igha- Xik. (i. p. 32: ‘ samaya’), distinguishes three uses of the compound term, one of which is that which is used in the discourse in question, namely, pativedha, or penetration, piereing, that is, by, as it were, an in thrust of mind. In the opening of the £ Abhisamaya-vagga,’ Sayyntta-Nil'., ii., 133, it is applied to one who compre- hends, and is used synonymously with ‘ acquiring a vision (eye) for things’; in the £ Vacchagotta-Sapyutta ’ (ibid., iii. 260) it is used synonymously with insight, vision, enlightenment, penetration. In the Milinda questions, again, we find it associated with pativedha: ‘Who have penetrated to a comprehension of the Four Truths (or Facts) ’ (transl. ii. 237). Similarly in the Dhammapada Corny.: ‘ Aggasavaka-vatthu ’ (i. 109 f.). The analytic aspect of intellectual activity being, as we 1 This work itself describes the four branches with some fulness. See PTS edition, ii. 147 f. 382 Patisambliid, A bhisam aijad have seen, so emphatically developed in the doctrine of Patisambhida, we are brought up against a dual view of cognition in Buddhist philosophy, suggestive of the sharper and more systematically worked out distinction in Henri Bergson’s philosophy between Vintelligence — the mind as analytic— and intuition, or that immediacy of in- sight which 4 by a sort of intellectual sympathy ’ lire. s-, or recreates that which it is coming-to-know. In the Ariyan — to resume Hr. Ledi’s note on Pati- s a m b h i d a — intuition or insight (a r i y a - m a g g a - h a n a) is accompanied by analysis. In the case of puthuj- j ana’s (‘average sensual folk,’ or it may be clever or learned, but not truly religious folk), much analytic insight may be developed after adequate studies. But that which they may thus acquire by s u t a m a y a - h a n a (cf . XX., 3) , i.e., intellect developed by information, is not so much a genuine intuitive insight as erudite insight. Thus in the Commentaries it is said : — “ But the worldling- wins no intuitive insight even after he has acquired much learning.” But there is no Ariyan who has not attained intuitive insight. And it is peculiarly his to practise that ekabhisamaya, or penetration into the unity of the real and the true, which is arrested and dismembered in analysis. His endeavour is, in the metaphor of the Katha-vatthu (II. 10), not to be content with the wand, wooden or gold, of language, pointing only at, but never revealing that which it tries to express, but to enter into the ‘ heap of paddy or of gold.’ That power of penetration, according to Ledi Sadaw (, JPTS ., 1914, p. 154 L), he can attain by persistent cultivation transforming his analytic, inferential knowledge. When won, its distinctive quality is the power of cognizing the purely phenomenal, the purely elemental stripped of the crust of the pseudo- permanencies : — 4 person,’ 4 being,’ 4 self,’ ‘ soul/ 4 persistent thing.’ The wand of language points to all these crust- names. By a bhisam ay a, pativedha, intuition,' he gets beneath them. * Assurance ’ 383 6. (A). Niyama, Niyama : ‘ Assurance.’ (V., 4, p. 177 ; VI., 1, p. 185 ; XIII., 4, p. 275.) Niyama means ‘ fixity,’ but niyama is ‘ that which fixes.’ The former is derived from ni-yam-ati, to fix; the latter from the causative: niyameti, to cause to be fixed. When the Path — i.e., a certain direction, course, tendency, profession, progressive system of a person’s life — is called sammatta, or, contrariwise, micehatta- niyama, both forms are understood in the causal sense. Thus the former * path ’ inevitably establishes the state of exemption from apaya’s (rebirth in misery), and the latter inevitably establishes purgatorial retribution after the next death. Niyama, then, is that by which the Niyama (the fixed, or inevitable order of things) is estab- lished, or that by which fixity is brought about, or marked out in the order of things. 1 (With reference to the appa- rently indiscriminate use of niyama, n i y a m a — see p. 275, n. 1 — the Burmese are wont carelessly to write the former for the latter, because they always pronounce the a short and quick.' 2 ) Our choice of Assurance may seem to give an undue subjectivity to the pair of terms. It is true that it lends itself here to criticism. And we confess that the -wish to get a term with the religious expressiveness that Assurance bears with it for readers nurtured in Christian tradition overbore our first thought of choosing certainty, fixity, fixed order. We may, however, add to our apology (1) that in XIX. 7, § 1, ‘ assurance ’ is opposed to ‘ doubt,’ which is unquestionably subjective ; (2) that both * assurance ’ and the Greek pleroplioria 3 have both an objective and a sub- jective import. ‘ Assurance ’ may mean a means or orderly arrangement through which we attain assured feeling, say, 1 Cf. Buddhism , London, 1912, p. 119 f. 2 Gf. English ‘drummer,’ which gives the sound of the short Indian a, 3 See Rom. xiv. 5 ; Col. ii. 2 ; 1 Thess. i. 5 ; Heb. vl 11 — ‘ to the full assurance of hope to the end.’ 384 Nii/ama, N iy a m a about our property. The Greek word is simply a ‘full conveyance,’ to wit, of news or evidence. We should not therefore be far from the truth in con- sidering our twin terms rendered by Assurance as the more subjective aspect of the Buddhist notion of course or destiny popularly and objectively expressed as Path (magga) — path good or bad : — the Way, narrow or broad, the Path, hoclos , via, of Christian doctrine, ‘the way of his saints,’ ‘the way of the evil man’ of the -Jewish doctrine (Pror. ii. 8, 12). 6. (B). Nmm and Karma. (XXL 7, 8.) The two discourses so numbered deal with the belief or disbelief in a rigid, inexorable uniformity of cause and effect in the cosmos, as obtaining not only as a general law, but also in all particular successions of cause-effect. In other words, can we predict for every phenomenon (dhamma), for every act (kamma), a corresponding, assignable result ? Is this result the immutable invariable result of that cause ? The term for such an immutable fixed result, for the Buddhist, is n i y a t a, an adjectival past participle corre- sponding to niy fima, on which see note A. The idea of predictability is also taken into account — see the interesting little discourse, V. 8 : — Of Insight into the Future — but the more prevailing notion qualifying the belief in cosmic order is that of fixity and of flexibility. The orthodox view is that, in the whole causal flux of ‘ happenings ’ — and these comprise all dhamma’s, all kamma’ s — there are only two rigid successions, or orders of specifically fixed kinds of cause-and-effect. These are — (1) The sammatta-niy am a; (2) the micehatta- niyama. By or in the latter, certain deeds, such as matricide, result in purgatorial retribution immediately after the doer’s next death. By or in the former, the Path- graduate will win eventually the highest ‘ fruit ’ and ‘ Assurance ’ 385 Nibbana. Neither result is meted out by any Celestial Power. Both results are inherent to that cosmodicy or natural order which includes a moral order (k a m ma- niyama), and which any judge, terrestrial or celestial, does or would only assist in carrying out. To that a Bud- dhist might adapt and apply the Christian logion : — ‘Before Abraham was, I am ’ — and say : — ‘ Before the Judge was, it is.’ That some happenings are moral, some immoral, is not so because of any pronouncements human or divine. The history of human ideas reveals mankind as not creating the moral code, but as evolving morally in efforts to interpret the moral order . 1 But these two fixed orders do not exhaust the universe of ‘ happenings.’ There is a third category belonging to neither. Hence the objection of the Theravadin to the word ‘all.’ Dhamma’s is a wider category than kamma’s or karma. "What is true of dhamma’s is true of kamma’s, for the former category includes the latter. But the line of reasoning in the discourse on dhamma’s refers to mind and matter as exhausting the universe of existence. As regards matter, we may illustrate by a modern instance. The opponent would maintain that both radium and helium are substances immutably fixed, each in its own nature, because of the, as yet, mysterious radio-active properties of the former, and because of the — so to speak — ‘ heliocity 1 of the latter. Now the Theravadin would nob know that radium may change into helium. But from his general point of view he would reply that anyway neither radium nor helium is immutably fixed, because they do not belong to either of the fixed orders recognized in his doctrine. Thus would he conclude respecting all dhamma’s that are not kamma’s. Concerning these, that is, moral and immoral acts, the opponent submits that the universal law of causation is uniform to this extent, that every kind of action must invariably, inevitably have its specific reaction, that the 1 Cf. Buddhism, London, 1912, chap. v. TS. V. 25 386 Thitata, Niyamata same k a m m a must have the same effect. This is accepted as true in tendency, and as a general theory only. But whereas Buddhist philosophy did not anticipate the Berg- sonian insight into the effects of vital causes amounting to new and unpredictable creations, it did and does recognize the immense complexity in the eventuation of moral results. Kamma’s, it teaches, are liable to be counteracted and deflected, compounded and annulled in what might be called the ‘composition of moral forces.’ 1 Hence there is nothing rigid, or, as we should say, definitely predictable, about their results in so far as they come under the Third or residual category mentioned above, and not under either of the two ‘ fixed ’ n i y a t a orders. 7. Thitata, Nixamata. (YI. 1, p. 187 ; XI. 7, p. 261.) T h i t i may be used to mean cause. And the yet more abstract form thitata, although, in the latter reference, we have called it ‘ state of being a cause,’ is used concretely as in the former reference (see n. 2), meaning 4 causes ’ by which resulting things are established. For in Abhi- dhamma only bhava-sadhana definitions — i.e., defi- nitions in terms of ‘ state,’ are recognized (see Compendium, p. 7). Hence dhiitu-dhamma-thitata becomes that which, as cause, establishes elements as effects. Thus it is applied to each term in the chain of causation (p a t i e c a - samuppada): to ignorance as the cause of karma (sankhara’s), to these as the cause of consciousness, and so on. Synonymous with this is the term dhamma-niyamata, meaning that which as cause invariably fixes thin gs, in our minds, as effects. Bearing these implications in mind, we may render the commentarial discussion of the Sutta-passage (p. 187, § 4, as follows: ‘What I have described above as dhatu- dhamma-thitatci, or - niyamata, is no other than 1 See, e.g., on classes of karma, Compendium , p. 143 f. Thitata, Niydmata 387 the terms “ ignorance,” etc. Whether the Tathagata has arisen or not, volitional actions of mind (karma) come into being because of ignorance, and rebirth-consciousness comes into being because of volitional actions of mind, etc. Hence in the phrase “ because of ignorance the actions of the mind,” ignorance is termed dhammathitata, because, as a cause or means, it establishes the dkamma’s which are actions of mind. Or again, “ignorance” is termed dhamma-niyamata because, as cause or means, it invariably fixes or marks them.’ The difference between the two synonyms would seem to be that -thitata is objective, -niyamata is sub- jective. In other words, the basic principle ‘ignorance,’ or any other a n g a in the chain, is there as a cause per se, whether Tathagatas arise or not. But because of the stability of the law of causality, or uniformity in the order of phenomena (dhamma-niyamata), or orderly pro- gression of the Norm, we are enabled by the principle of induction to infer the effect from the cause. It is clear, from our Commentary, that d h a m m a in this connection means ‘ effects ’ the Chain of Causa- tion. Moreover, the A bhid hart appadtpikci-s u cl refers both synonyms to effect thitd v a sd dhdtu dhammathitata dhamma-niyamata dduu ‘ paccayuppannc ’ — i.e., ‘in the effect.’ This last term —paticca-samuppaiuia, and is op- posed to p a e c a y a : cause, condition, and p a t i e c a - samuppada: any concrete cause (in the causal formula) . See ‘ Paccaya.’ 8. Nimitta. (X. 3, § 4, p. 246.) Nimitta is derived by some from ni + ma, to limit ; and is defined as ‘ that which limits its own fruit (effect) ’ : attano phalar) niminateti (X bid diulna ppad'tpikd- silcl). According to this definition it denotes a causal factor, limiting, determining, conditioning, characterizing, etc., its own effect. 1 Hence anything entering into a causal 1 Cf. p. 226, n. !:■ 888 Nimitta relation, by which its effect is signified, marked, or charac- terized, is a nimitta. An object, image, or concept which, on being meditated upon, induces samadhi (Jhana) is a nimitta (see the stages specified in Com- pendium, p. 54). False opinion (ditthi) engendered by hallucination concerning impermanence — in other words, a perverted view of things as permanent — is a nimitta {ibid., p. 217). This functions either as a cause of ‘ will-to- live,’ or as a sign of worldliness. Emancipation from this nimitta is termed animittavimokkha (ibid., p. 216). Again, sexual characters are comprised under four heads: linga, nimitta, akappa, kutta, nimitta, standing for outward characteristics, male or female (Bud. Psy. Eth., §§ 633, 634). Later exegeses, deriving the word from the root mih, to pour out, are probably derivations cV occasion. Now in this argument (X. 3) the opponent confuses the n a n i m i 1 1 a a h i — ‘ does not grasp at the general sex characters of the object seen, heard, etc.’ — of the quotation with animitta, a synonym, like ‘ emptiness ’ (suniiata) of Nibbana. He judges that the Path- graduate, when he is not -n i m i 1 1 a-grasping, is grasping the a-n i m i 1 1 a or signless (Nibbana) , instead of exercising self-control in presence of alluring features in external ob- jects, whether these be attractive human beings or what not. According to the Commentary the expression cited, ‘does not grasp at, etc.,’ refers ‘not to the moment of visual or other sense-consciousness, but to the javana- k k h a n a, or moment of apperception ; hence even in the worldly course of things it is inconclusive.’ This is made clearer in the following discourse (X. 4), where ethical matters are stated to lie outside the range of sense-con- sciousness as such. 9. Sangaha: Classification. (VII. '1, p. 195.) This little discourse is interesting for its bearing on the historic European controversy between Universals and Sangaha : Glassification 389 Particulars, dating from Herakleitus and Parmenides, two and a half centuries before the date of our work, with the problems : How can the Many be One ? How can the One be in the Many? Both the Kathavatthu and its Commentary oppose the limiting of groupable things to mental facts. If certain things be counted one by one, they reach a totality (gananag gacchanti), say, a totality of five. This total needs a generic concept to express itself. If the five units happen to possess common, say, bovine, attributes, we apply the concept ‘ bullocks/ ‘ cows.’ So with the concept ‘ dog,’ which holds together all individuals possessing canine attributes. Again, if we were to count by groups, say, three bullocks and three dogs, the units would reach the same total. But we should require a more general, a ‘higher’ concept — ‘animal,’ or the like— to include both species. Now whether we have relatively homogeneous units under a general notion, or relatively heterogeneous groups under a wider notion, they reach hereby an abridged statement (u d d e s a g gacchanti) in the economy of thought. 1 The Theravadin, as we have recorded, does not approve of the crude rope simile, because the material bond is necessarily different from the mental concept, and the term, physical and mental, binding units together. Neither does he altogether disapprove of the simile, since language, rooted in sense-experience, compels us to illustrate mental processes by material phenomena. 10. Paribhoga : Utility. (VII. 5.) Paribhoga is enjoyment. Utility, as ethicists and economists use the term, is enjoyability, positive benefit. 1 It is interesting to compare the g an an a (number), sangaha (class), uddesa (abridged statement), of Tissa’s Katha-vatthu with such disquisitions on number, class, general term, as that by Mr. Bertrand Bussell in his examination of Frege’s Grundlagen der Arithmetic in 1 Our Knowledge of the External World,’ p. 201 f. 390 Paccaya : Correlation And the opponents claim that ‘ there is merit consisting in the fact, not that the good deed was done with benevolent intention, but that the deed done is bestowing enjoyment or utility.’ The orthodox argument seeks only to prove the unsoundness of this way of reckoning merit (for the doer), either on grounds of psychological process 1 or of ethics 3. His own position, stated positively, is that the donor’s will (cetana) or intention is the only standard, criterion, ultimate court of appeal, by which to judge of the merit (to himself) of his act. Posterity may bless him for utility accruing to it. But if he gave as a benefactor malgre hi, he will in future be, not better, but worse off. 11. Paccaya: Correlation. (XV. 1, 2.) The word paccaya, 1 used in popular diction, together with h et u, for ‘ cause ’ or ‘ reason why,’ is closely akin to our * relation.’ Be and petti (paccaya is contracted from pati-aya) are coincident in meaning. Ay a is a causative form of i, ‘ to go,’ giving ‘ go back ’ for the Latin relatus, * carry back.’ Now ‘ relation,’ as theory of ‘ things as having to do with each other,’ put into the most general terms possible, includes the class called causal relation, viz., things as related by way of cause-effect. But paccaya, as relation, implies that, for Buddhist philosophy, all modes of relation have causal significance, though the causal efficacy, as power to produce the effect, may be absent. To understand this we must consider everything, not as statically existing, but as ‘happening,’ or ‘event.’ We may then go on to define paccaya as an event which helps to account for the happening of the paceayup- panna, i.e., the effect, or ‘ what-has-happened-through-the- paccaya.’ These two terms are thus ‘ related.’ Dropping our notion of efficient cause (A as having power to pro- duce B), and holding to the ‘ helping to happen ’ notion, 1 Pronounce pdch-chdya with the same cadence as ‘ bachelor.’ Paccaya : Correlation 391 we see this recognized in the definition of paccaya as ‘ that which was the essential mark of helping, of working up to (upakaraka),’ namely, to a given happening. 1 It may not produce, or alone bring to pass, that happening ; but it is concerned therewith. Calling it the paccaya. A, and the other term, the other happening, B, the paccayuppanna, and referring to the tw’enty-four classes of relations distinguished in Abhidhamma, A may ‘ help ’ as being ‘ contiguous,’ ‘ re- peated,’ a ‘ dominant ’ circumstance, or by ‘ leading towards,’ as ‘ path ’ (m a g g a - p a c e a y a) or means. But only such a paccaya as ‘ will ’ (c e t a n a) related, as ‘ karma,’ 2 to a result (v ip aka), is adequate to produce, or to cause that result B. In the expression idappaccayat a — 4 conditionedness of this — ‘ this ’ (i d a) refers to B, but the compound refers to A: A is the ‘pace ay a-of-t/uV The abstract form is only the philosophic way of expressing paccaya. The terms discussed above — dhamma-thitata, dhamma-niyamat a — are synonymous with i d a p - paccayata, and mean B is established through A, is fixed through A. This does not mean ‘ is produced (solely) by A,’ but only ‘happens whenever A happens,’ and ‘ happens because, inter alia, A happens.’ In other words, by a constant relation between A and B, we are enabled to infer the happening of B from the happening of A. The classification of relations by the Hon. B. Bussell, referred to on p. 294, n. 3, is as follows : — ‘ A relation is symmetrical if, whenever it holds between A and B, it also holds between B and A;’ asymmetrical, ‘if it does not hold between B and A.’ But of yet greater interest is it to see this learned author, ignorant to all appearances of perhaps one subject only — Buddhist philosophy — generalizing the whole concept of causality in terms of relations, namely, ‘ that what is constant in a causal law is not ’A or B, 1 Buddhist Psychology , London, 1914, p. 194 f. 3 In the mode called janaka-kamma (reproductive karma). See Compendium , loc cit. 392 Time and Space ‘ but the relation between A and B . . . that a causal law involves not one datum, but many, and that the general scheme of a causal law will be ‘ Whenever things occur in certain relations to each other, another thing, B, having a fixed relation to those A’s, will occur in a certain time- relation to them ’ (op. cit., 215 i). Or again, ‘ The law of causation . . . may be enunciated as follows : — There are certain invariable relations between different events,’ etc. (p. 221). These ‘invariable relations ’ are, for Buddhists, the twenty-four kinds of paeeayas, including the time- relation, which are conceived, not as efficient causes, but as ‘ events 5 which in happening ‘ help ’ to bring about the correlated event called paccayuppanna. 12. Time and Space. In the Abhidhanappadlpilca-sucl 1 time is defined under three aspects : — 1. ‘ Time is a concept by which the terms of life, etc., are cpunted or reckoned. 2. * Time is that “ passing by ” reckoned as “ so much has passed,” etc. 8. ‘Time is eventuation or happening, there being no such thing as time exempt from events.’ The second aspect refers to the fact of change or imper- manence ; the third brings up the fact of perpetual becom- ing. From perpetual becoming we get our idea of abstract time (m a h a - k a 1 a), which is eternal, and lacks the com- mon distinction of past, present, future, but which, to adopt M. Bergson’s phraseology, ‘looked at from the point of view of multiplicity, . . disintegrates into a powder of moments, none of which endures.’ 2 3 ... 1 For the general reader we may state that this valuable book, by the venerable scholar Subhiiti Maha-Thera, published at Colombo 1893, is an Index and Corny, on a work on Pali nouns, written by the rammarian Moggallana in the twelfth century a.d. 3 Introd. to Metaphysics , 51. 393 Time and Space Now it is clear from the Kathavatthu 1 that, for Budd- hism, time-distinctions have no objective existence of their own, and that reality is confined to the present. The past reality has perished ; the future reality is not yet become. And when Buddhist doctrine says that reality is present, both these terms refer to one and the same thing per se. When this gives up its reality, it gives up its presence ; when it gives up being present, it ceases to be real . 2 Things in time are not immutably fixed . 3 In Ledi Sadaw’s words : — As in our present state there is, so in our past has there been, so in the future will there be, just a succession of purely phenomenal happenings, proceedings, consisting solely of arisings and eeasings, hard to discern . . . because the procedure is ever obscured by our notion of continuity .’ 4 Thus they who have not penetrated reality ‘ see only a continuous and static condition in these phenomena .’ 5 Now each momentary state or uprising of mind 6 is logically complex and analyzable, but psychologically, actually, a simple indivisible process. There is a succession of these states, and their orderly procession is due to the natural uniformity of mental sequence — the Chitta-niyama . 7 And they present a continuous spectrum of mind in which one state shades off into another, laterally and lineally, so that it is hard to say ‘where,’ or when one ends and the other begins. The laws or principles discernible in these mental con- tinua of the Chitta-niyama are, according to Buddhist philosophy, five of the twenty - four casual relations (paeeaya), to wit, ‘contiguity,’ immediate contiguity (in time), absence, abeyance, sufficing condition. Ex- plained without such technicalities, the past state, albeit 1 See I. 6-8. 2 See I. 6, § 5. 3 See I. 10. 4 1 Some Points of Buddhist Doctrine,’ JPTS , 1918-14, p. 121. 6 Ibid., 155. 6 Ehakhkanika-cit tupp d d a . 7 See Mrs. Bh. D., Buddhism , 1912, p. 119, and Ledi Sadaw’s ‘Expositions’ ( Buddhist Beview , October, 1915). 894 Accanta : Finality it is absent, gone, has become wrought up into its imme- diate successor, the present state, as a new whole. These five are compared to the five strands of a thread on which are strung the pearls of a necklace . 1 But each indivisible whole was real only while it lasted. Matter, no less than mind, is logically resolved into different qualities, which we group, classify, explain. But nature gives us simple, indivisible wholes, qualities mutu- ally inseparable, even in a dual existence such as that of intelligent organisms. The whole is actually indivisible, body and mind being inseparable. Now what time is to life, space is to matter. Space, like time, is a permanent concept or mental construction, which constitutes a sufficing condition for the movement of bodies. It is void, unperceivable, without objective reality. 13. Accanta : Finality. (XIX. 7.) Accanta is ati-anta : 2 beyond the end, or the very last. Like e k a n t a, it is rendered by Burmese translators ‘ true,’ and for this reason : The only assurance we get from science that the sun will rise to-morrow, and at a given time, is our belief in the uniformity of Nature, a belief established by past observation yielding no excep- tion to the rule. The belief amounts, as we say, to a moral certainty — i.e.,we can act upon it. But since, for all w’e know, some unforeseen force may divert the relative positions of sun and earth, the uniformity of physical nature is not an order of things which has reached finality in certainty. In other w r ords, it is not ‘ true ’ absolutely. 1 Cf. Compendium, p. 43 ; Mrs. Eh, D., Buddhist Psychology, 1914, p. 194 1 2 This, when pronounced atyanta, slips into the full cerebral double c (which is pronounced cc:7t). Cf. p a c c a y a (see Note 11). N ipphan n a, Par in ipph aim a 895 14. N IPPH ANN A, PaRINIPEHANNA : DETERMINED, PREDETERMINED. (XI. 7 ; XXIII. 5). This word is, according to the Abhidhdn appadlp ikasucl , derived from the root ‘ pad,’ ‘ to go,’ through its causal verb ‘ padeti,’ £ to move or set agoing.’ The prefix £ ni ’ alters the meaning of £ being set agoing ’ into £ being accomplished’ (aid dhiy a g). Ledi Sadaw qualifies this meaning by ‘accomplished by causes, such as karma, etc.’ (kammadihi paccayehi nipphaditap). Now karma is psychologically reduced to volition (cetana)* Hence anything accomplished by volition is £ accomplished by causes,’ or £ determined.’ And if karma happens to be past, the word under discussion implies £ predetermination.’ This term is technically applied to the eighteen kinds of material qualities, 1 the remaining ten, in the dual classification of matter, being termed anipphannarupa’s, or £ un-pre- determined.’ The following quotation from the Abhidhammavatara (p. 74 PTS. Ed.) is in point: — ‘(It may be urged that) if these (ten) be undetermined, they would be unconditioned. But how can they be unconditioned when they are changing their aspects (vikaratta)? These (un-) determined, too, are conditioned. Thus the conditionedness of the (un-) determined may be understood.’ Prom the Buddhist point of view, Nibbana alone is unconditioned. Therefore the Conditioned includes both the £ determined ’ and the £ undetermined.’ The Katha XXIII. 5 indicates the general use of the term parinipphanna. The Burmese translators do not distinctively bring out the force of the prefix £ pari.’ A paticcasamuppannadh amma, i.e., anything that springs into being through a cause, is necessarily con- ditioned (sankhata). And one of the characteristic marks of the conditioned is impermanence. The universal 1 See A bJvidhamm ava to ra, loc. cit. ; Compendium, p. 156. 396 Nipplianna, Parinipphanna proposition — ‘ Whatever is impermanent is ill ’ — is a Bud- dhist thesis. Mind and matter are both impermanent and are, therefore, ill. In other words, our personality — or more analytically, personality minus craving — constitutes the First Ariyan Fact of 111. Ill, thus distributed, is determined. But the opponent errs in regarding the content of the term parinipphanna as exhausted by 111 proper. By this unnecessary restriction he errs in his application of the contrary term aparinipphanna to other factors of life. Since a Dhamma or phenomenon other than Nibbana is conditioned, it follows that each link in the chain of causa- tion is conditioned. Take mind-and-body (n a m a r u p a) :• — this we have shown to be a patiecasamuppanna because it comes into being through causes. And though it may also act as a paticcasamuppada or causal antecedent in turn, it is not determined as such, i.e., qiul cause. Dhammathitata is nothing more than a paticcasamuppada stated in an abstract form. Now in XI. 7 the opponent regards ‘ the state of being a cause ’ as different from the causal element and, therefore, as determined separately from the thing itself. In other words, the opponent holds that causality or causation itself, connoted by the term dhammathitata, is determined. Again, aniccata and j a r a t a, as mere aspects of ‘ determined ? matter, are two of the admittedly anipphan- narupa’s. And by analogy, aniccata of mind would be equally undetermined. In fact, aniccata, as a mere mark of the conditioned, is not specially determined, as the opponent, in XI. 8, would have it to be. 15. Willing, Anticipating, Aiming. (VIII. 9, § 1, p. 221 f.) Since sending this discourse to press, we have discovered that the triad : — e willing, anticipating, aiming ’ ( cetand , patthand, panidhi ), so often in the present work added to Willing, Anticipating, Aiming 397 the four other mental activities : { adverting, ideating, co- ordinated application, attending,’ occurs in the Anguttara- Nikaya, v. 212 f. E.g. 4 when a person has all the attributes of the Ariyan Eightfold Path, coupled with true insight and emancipation, whatever he does in accordance with the rightness of his views, what he wills, anticipates, aims at, whatever his activities : — all these will conduce to that which is desirable, lovely, pleasant, good and happy.’